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I. INTRODUCTION 
In late 1982, Peter Popovich, who was soon to become the first 
Chief Judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, was doing his 
research and sounding out members of the bar.  I happened to be 
in the hallway at Briggs and Morgan’s St. Paul office when he was 
just leaving a conversation with Leonard Keyes, a Briggs partner, a 
former Ramsey County District Court Judge, and an authority on 
all things judicial.  As they passed, Keyes made this closing remark, 
“remember, you are to be an error-correcting court—don’t go 
making judicial policy.” 
It struck me then as an odd concept.  But, of course, I should 
have known that it was not a foreign idea because the federal 
judiciary and the states that preceded Minnesota with intermediate 
appellate courts had already struggled to define the relationship 
between an intermediate appellate court and its corresponding 
supreme court. 
When Congress added the courts of appeals to the federal 
judiciary in 1891, it contemplated that the court would fulfill an 
error-correcting function and the Supreme Court would continue 
to perform the law-developing foundation.1  The role of the federal 
courts of appeal has changed, however, as caseload pressures and 
increasing federal jurisdiction have required the courts of appeal to 
declare and define the national law, subject only to Supreme Court 
review.2
 
 1.  Evarts Act, Ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891); Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: 
Time for Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 11, 21–23 (1996). 
 2.  Dragich, supra note 1, at 21–23 (citing Commission on Revision of Federal 
Court Appellate System, Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for 
Change, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975)). 
  The federal courts of appeal are—for the majority of cases 
2
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litigated in the federal system—the court of last resort.3
The experiences of two regional states demonstrate that there 
is no uniform mold for defining the role of an intermediate 
appellate court.  When Wisconsin created its court of appeals in 
1978, it designed the court to be a “high-volume, error-correcting 
court.”
 
4  But, most commentators would agree that, in reality, the 
court has become a “de facto law-developing Court.”5  In fact, the 
Chief Justice of Wisconsin has directly observed that the court of 
appeals has two functions: “an error correcting function, and a law-
defining and developing function.”6  It has been suggested that this 
law-developing function is inevitable because the Wisconsin Court 
of Appeals publishes three times more opinions, its published 
decisions are binding precedent, and its decisions cover a wider 
range of topics.7  It has been suggested that the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals “makes law in the ‘micro’ sense through its application of 
the existing law to a new fact pattern, and the Supreme Court 
develops law in the ‘macro’ sense of taking only cases with ideal fact 
patterns that involve questions of public policy.”8
The Nebraska Court of Appeals, on the other extreme, was 
strictly limited to its error-correcting function.  In fact, as originally 
constituted, the decisions of the court of appeals were not even 




 3.  Mary Garvey Algero, A Step in the Right Direction: Reducing Intercircuit 
Conflicts by Strengthening the Value of Federal Appellate Court Decisions, 70 TENN. L. 
REV. 605, 613 (2003) (citing Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Comm’r, 314 U.S. 326, 335 
(1941)) (explaining that the benefits of uniformity and finality achieved by en banc 
review “are especially important in view of the fact that in our federal judicial system 
these courts are the courts of last resort in the run of ordinary cases”); see also Thomas E. 
Baker, Imagining the Alternative Futures of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 GA. L. REV. 
913, 959 (1994) (referring to the federal courts of appeals as “junior varsity supreme 
court[s]” because they frequently have the final say on issues of federal law within their 
circuits). 
 4.  Swan v. Elections Bd., 394 N.W.2d 732, 735 (Wis. 1986). 
 5.  Matthew E. Gabrys, Comment, A Shift into the Bottleneck: The Appellate 
Caseload Problem Twenty Years After the Creation of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 
1998 WIS. L. REV. 1547, 1555 (1998). 
 6.  Cook v. Cook, 560 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Wis. 1997). 
 7.  Gabrys, supra note 5, at 1557–58. 
 8.  Id. at 1558. 
 9.  Metro Renovation v. Neb. Dep’t of Labor, 543 N.W.2d 715, 721–22 (Neb. 
1996). 
  The Nebraska 
Supreme Court reasoned that, because the court of appeals was 
intended to be an error-correcting court, and the statutes creating 
it did not expressly give its decisions precedential value, only 
3
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decisions of the supreme court could create precedent.10  In other 
words, the decisions of the court of appeals were binding only on 
the parties to the case before it.  Later, the Nebraska Legislature 
amended the statute to provide that the court of appeals decisions 
did have precedential value.11
The Minnesota Court of Appeals was established twenty-five 
years ago to act as an error-correcting court.  Although the 
enabling statute does not expressly state that the court’s published 
decisions are precedential, that conclusion is clear by negative 
inference from the provision that “[u]npublished opinions of the 
Court of Appeals are not precedential.”
 
12 The court of appeals has 
frequently reminded litigants that it serves to correct errors, not to 
make policy or judicial doctrine for the state.13  And sometimes the 
supreme court has issued a friendly reminder to the court of 
appeals.14
II. HISTORY 
The error-correcting function of the court of appeals is not 
new and, in fact, was the original intent in creating the 
intermediate court.  To properly understand the Minnesota Court 
of Appeals’s function and purpose as an error-correcting court, its 
creation must be put into context. 
 
Nonetheless, the court of appeals, just as the district court, 
must decide the case before it.  That means the court must, at 
times, decide issues of first impression, some of which require it to 
resolve competing public-policy interests.  The essential function of 
the court, however, is to review the district court record and correct 
errors or confirm that no errors were made.  Unlike Wisconsin, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has not recognized the law-developing 
function of the Minnesota Court of Appeals. 
Twenty-five years ago, the landscape of Minnesota’s court 
system changed remarkably with the creation of the court of 
appeals.  At one time, the Minnesota court system comprised three 
 
 10.  Id. at 715. 
 11.  L.B. 1296, Neb. Unicameral, 94th Leg., 2nd Sess. (1996). 
 12.  MINN. STAT. § 480A.08, subdiv. 3(c) (2008). 
 13.  See, e.g., Anderson v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 465 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1991). 
 14.  See, e.g., Pike v. Gunyon, 491 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Minn. 1992); Sefkow v. 
Sexton, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988). 
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss4/10
   
2009] LIMITATIONS OF AN ERROR-CORRECTING COURT 1265 
types of district courts15
In the early 1980s, dramatic increases in the number of filings 
placed substantial pressure on the supreme court’s ability to fulfill 
all of these functions.  Burdened by such large caseloads, the 
supreme court was required to focus most of its energies on error 
correcting rather than developing the law of Minnesota.  The court 
sat in panels and made frequent use of summary dispositions,
 and the Minnesota Supreme Court.  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court alone shouldered the burden of 
reviewing all civil and criminal appeals, appeals from certain 
administrative agency determinations, and special matters such as 
writs of mandamus or prohibition.  In addition to those duties, the 
supreme court was expected to develop new law and judicial 
policies, as well as provide administrative oversight for the entire 
judicial system.   
16 
leaving litigants with little understanding of the rationale behind 
the court’s decisions.  As former Court of Appeals Judge and 
Supreme Court Justice Peter Popovich remarked, “[a]s a matter of 
policy the right to appeal was rarely denied, but the burden of 
maintaining that policy was becoming overwhelming.”17
In making the case for an intermediate court, the Judicial 
Planning Committee noted that the creation of an intermediate 
appellate court would do away with the summary dispositions and 
provide “a high quality of appellate justice by insuring that judges, 
not appointed staff, consider and decide cases.”
 
18  An intermediate 
court of appeals would enable “all appellate disputes to be resolved 
with dispatch,”19 enhance the geographic accessibility of the 
appellate process by allowing cases to be heard in various locations 
throughout the state, and “permit[] more litigants to appeal.”20
Creating an intermediate appellate court would . . . 
reduce the rate of delay of appellate dispositions.  It 
would enable the Supreme Court to focus on the 
development of case law.  It would provide an appellate 
court with primary responsibility to review district court 
  
The Judicial Planning Committee’s report concluded: 
 
 15. The district courts, county courts, and municipal courts. 
 16. Decisions without written explanation or analysis. 
 17. PETER S. POPOVICH, BEGINNING A JUDICIAL TRADITION: FORMATIVE YEARS OF 
THE MINNESOTA COURT OF APPEALS 1983–1987, 8 (1987). 
 18. Gregory A. Lang, The Case for a Minnesota Court of Appeals (Minnesota 
Supreme Court, Judicial Planning Committee 1980).   
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
5
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decisions and correct errors.  It would assure a high 
quality of justice.  It would make the appellate system 
more accessible to litigants.  The Court of Appeals will 
benefit the litigants, the bar, and the bench.21
Judge Popovich had high goals for the court, noting that “I 
would presume ninety percent of the cases would stop here . . . .  A 
few cases on a writ will go on.”
 
After years of work, preparation and study, the Minnesota 
Legislature, in 1982, passed enabling legislation for the 
intermediate appellate court.  Following the requirements for 
amending the state constitution, the proposal to create a court of 
appeals was presented to the electorate that same year.  Voters 
approved the amendment and the Minnesota Court of Appeals was 
established in 1983. 
22  Commenting on the precise role 
of the new court he said, “We’ll be an error-correcting court.  We 
will not be legislative . . . after all, that’s up to the Supreme Court 
and the legislature.”23
The Office of the State Court Administration’s report on the 
“new” appellate court’s first year of operation showed that the 




The original, mandatory jurisdiction of the supreme court was 
reduced so that most of its workload came by discretionary petition.  
But the creation of the intermediate court did more than simply 
reallocate the supreme court’s workload.  Under the reorganized 
  The court of appeals processed a high volume of cases 
with a focus on error correction.  The court of appeals had 
jurisdiction over almost all traditional appeals and writ matters 
previously brought before the supreme court, reducing the original 
appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court to a fraction of its 
former level.  The court granted oral argument to all parties who 
requested it and traveled to each of the judicial districts around the 
state to hear cases.  It published opinions at a rate which exceeded 
most other appellate courts.  Ultimately, the court’s workload 
would grow to average almost twenty-five hundred decisions each 
year. 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. ROLAND C. AMUNDSON, THE FIRST TEN: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE FIRST 
TEN YEARS OF THE MINNESOTA COURT OF APPEALS (1993).  
 23. Id. 
 24. OFFICE OF THE STATE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, THE NEW MINNESOTA 
APPELLATE COURT SYSTEM: REPORT ON THE FIRST FULL YEAR OF OPERATION: 1984 
(1985).  
6
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appellate system, the supreme court could give full consideration to 
issues of statewide, precedential, or constitutional significance.  
Once again, the supreme court could hear matters en banc and 
focus on the development of the law and the expression of legal 
principles.   
In addition to putting the significant, statewide, precedential 
issues before the supreme court, the work of the court of appeals 
involving error correction allowed the supreme court to perform its 
supervisory and administrative responsibilities, which are critical to 
the effective and efficient functioning of Minnesota’s legal and 
judicial systems.  The following observations concerning the 
purpose for the Indiana Court of Appeals have equal application in 
Minnesota: 
Without some restriction on access to a court of last 
resort, that court’s ability to act in its law-giving function 
will eventually be destroyed in favor of its error-correcting 
function.  Creation of an intermediate court can limit 
access to the state’s supreme court and protect its law-
giving function from the dangers of an unrestricted 
docket.  That protection is only as successful as the 
supreme court’s authority to select what it will consider 
from the trial courts or the intermediate court.25
III. PURPOSE AND FUNCTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
When creating the court of appeals, the legislature intended it 
to correct district court errors while reserving the establishment of 
new legal concepts to the supreme court.  These goals provided the 
framework for the court of appeals’s internal rules of operation, 
which were published and widely disseminated.  In the 
introductory paragraph to its internal rules, the court’s purpose is 
clearly stated as follows: 
 
The Court of Appeals is an intermediate appellate court.  
It is primarily decisional and error correcting rather than 
a legislative or doctrinal court.  Its primary function is the 
correction of error by application of legal principles.  Its 
task is to find the law, to state it and apply it to the facts.  
Only when there are no statutory or judicial precedents to 
 
 25.  Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard, Changing the Constitutional Jurisdiction of 
the Indiana Supreme Court: Letting a Court of Last Resort Act Like One, 63 IND. L.J. 
669, 680 (1988). 
7
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follow will the Court of Appeals make new law.26
Federal courts have begun to recognize the vital role that the 
court of appeals plays in the development of Minnesota law.  The 
general rule still exists that federal courts exercising diversity 
jurisdiction are only bound by state law as determined by the 
highest state court.  But recent decisions in the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals and the Federal District Court of Minnesota 
acknowledged that decisions of the court of appeals—while not 
binding—are highly persuasive and should be followed when they 
are the best evidence of state law.
 
As an error-correcting court, the court of appeals reviews 
district court proceedings to determine: (1) whether there was 
sufficient evidence to sustain the judgment, (2) whether proper 
district-court procedure was used, and (3) whether the settled law 
was applied to the facts as reflected in the record.  This standard of 
review differs from the duties of the supreme court, which is 
required to consider cases to: (1) resolve conflicts and thus 
maintain doctrinal harmony, (2) provide authoritative construction 
of the Minnesota and United States Constitutions, (3) determine 
the validity of Minnesota statutes, and (4) establish or modify 
common-law principles of statewide importance. 
Because significantly fewer cases reach Minnesota’s highest 
court, as a practical matter the court of appeals is a de facto court 
of last resort for most litigants.  Thus, the court of appeals plays a 
very substantial role in the application of the common law, the 
interpretation of statutes, and virtually all areas of civil and criminal 
law.  Although the supreme court is primarily concerned with the 
precedential impact of its decisions on future litigants, the court of 
appeals is primarily concerned with the resolution of the case 
before it. 
27
IV. COURT OF APPEALS RECOGNIZES ITS LIMITATIONS AS AN ERROR-
CORRECTING COURT 
 
The court of appeals often expressly describes its role as an 
intermediate court, recognizing its own limitations as an “error-
correcting” court.  The primary area where the court of appeals 
 
 26. MINN. CT. APP. INTERNAL R. 1 (repealed 1991). 
 27. Bureau of Engraving v. Fed. Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 1175, 1176 (8th Cir. 1993); 
Nelson Distrib., Inc., v. Stewart-Warner Indus. Balancers, 808 F. Supp. 684, 687 (D. 
Minn. 1992). 
8
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recognizes this limitation is when it is asked to create a new 
common law cause of action.  For example, in two specific cases, 
the court of appeals refused to create new common law causes of 
action: loss of consortium and the negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. 
In Belisle v. Dori,28 the court of appeals rejected the right to 
claim loss of consortium to unmarried persons who held 
themselves out as married.29  The court stated as follows: “[t]his 
court, as an error-correcting court, is without authority to change 
the law.  It is not the function of this court to establish new causes 
of action, even when such actions appear to have merit.”30  The 
court declined to reach the merits of Belisle’s argument that the 
common law should reflect societal changes.31
Similarly, in Engler v. Wehmas,
 
32 the court demonstrated its 
limitations when it refused to expand the common law cause of 
action of negligent infliction of emotional distress.33  The plaintiff 
in Engler, a mother, witnessed her young child get hit by a car and 
commenced a lawsuit claiming negligent infliction of emotional 
distress arising from her fear for her own safety and the distress 
caused by witnessing her son’s injuries.34  If the court allowed the 
plaintiff to recover, the door would open for allowing liability to be 
extended to a third party.35  The court declined to expand the 
scope of negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, 
explaining that it was not the function of the court of appeals to 
create new law.36
The court of appeals further demonstrated its limited function 
as an error-correcting court when asked to change an existing 
common law standard.  For example, in Miller v. Mercy Medical 
Center,
 
37 the court was asked to recognize, for the first time, the 
discovery rule in medical-malpractice actions in lieu of the current 
standard, the termination-of-treatment rule.38
 
 28. No. C6-99906, 1999 WL 1038013, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 1999). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. 633 N.W.2d 868, 873 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 870. 
 35. See id. at 872. 
 36. Id. 
 37. 380 N.W.2d 827, 831 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
 38. Id. 
  The discovery rule, 
which tolled the statute of limitations for medical-malpractice 
9
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actions until the negligent act is discovered, had been adopted by 
courts in a sizable number of states.  The court of appeals, citing its 
internal rules, acknowledged that its job was primarily decisional 
and error-correcting rather than legislative or doctrinal.39  The 
court held that it would not reverse longstanding judicial 
precedent by adopting the discovery rule over the termination-of-
treatment rule.40
Of course, the creation of precedent is a natural and necessary 
component of the common law system.  One commentator 
observed that when presented with an issue of first impression, a 
court of appeals must “break new ground or else fail to decide the 
case that was before it.”
 
These examples demonstrate the challenges of operating as an 
error-correcting court while being a de facto court of last resort.  In 
both Miller v. Mercy Medical Center and Belisle v. Dori, the supreme 
court denied further review.  Both cases presented strong policy 
arguments in favor of changing the existing law.  Yet in both cases, 
the court of appeals declined to change the law, recognizing the 
limits of its error-correcting responsibilities. 
41  Another commentator viewed the role of 
an intermediate court as follows: “Until a point has been settled by 
the higher court it is the function of the inferior tribunal to render 
its decision on the point involved; to express its best thinking for 
the appraisal of the higher court.”42
We acknowledge that we are primarily an error-correcting 
court.  Minn. Ct. App. Internal R. 1.  Where our appellate 
courts have not clearly addressed the central issue in a 
case, however, it is our duty to note the direction of 
developments and to anticipate changes in the law.
   
The court of appeals itself struggled with this dilemma—
sometimes fully addressing the merits of a case of true first 
impression, where the supreme court previously neither accepted 
nor rejected the proposition argued, while at other times declining 
to decide the issue even when it is not bound by clear precedent.  
For example, compare these two statements: 
43
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Robert A. Leflar, The Task of the Appellate Court, 33 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
548, 549 (1958). 
 42. Charles M. Merrill, Some Reflections on the Business of Judging, 40 CAL. ST. 
B.J. 811, 812–13 (1965).   
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This argument states a claim for “loss of chance,” a 
medical malpractice doctrine that Minnesota has neither 
adopted nor rejected.   This court, as primarily an error-
correcting court, is hesitant to adopt new theories of law.44
In one interesting example, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
allowed the court of appeals to determine several cases of first 
impression regarding awarding attorneys’ fees under the 
declaratory judgment act, declining further review.
 
45  But in Garrick 
v. Northland Insurance Co.,46 the supreme court granted review on 
that issue and reversed the prior holdings of the court of appeals.47  
The supreme court held that the court of appeals exceeded its 
authority in deciding legislative policy.48  In fact, the supreme court 
itself declined to review that policy, deferring the question to the 
legislature.49
Just a few years later, the supreme court reprimanded the 
court of appeals for exceeding its authority by deciding a case of 
first impression.  In Pike v. Gunyou,
  Although the supreme court has the powers of a 
doctrinal court, it often declines to exercise them in situations 
where it believes that the legislature is in a better position to hear 
from all interested constituents and consider all aspects of public 
policy.  Often this cannot be done within the constraints of an 
actual case and controversy. 
50 the court of appeals addressed 
a taxpayer’s challenge to legislation authorizing bonds to finance 
construction and repairs of an aircraft maintenance facility.51  The 
court of appeals held the statute at issue applied to the taxpayer’s 
suit and ordered appellants post a bond or have their suit dismissed 
with prejudice.52
 
 44. Fabio v. Bellomo, 489 N.W.2d 241, 245 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
  In deciding this issue, the court of appeals 
recognized that the supreme court might extend further review to 
the matter, providing guidance on the legal principles applied in 
 45. See, e.g., Wondra v. Am. Family Ins. Group, 432 N.W.2d 455, 460–61 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Kline v. Hanover Ins. Co., 368 N.W.2d 381, 383 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1985). 
 46. 469 N.W.2d 709, 714 n.2 (Minn. 1991). 
 47. Id. at 714. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. (“If the change in Minnesota’s historical doctrine is to be made, it 
seems to us that this argument ought to be directed to the legislature.”). 
 50. 488 N.W.2d 298, 300 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), vacated, 491 N.W.2d 288 
(Minn. 1992). 
 51. Id. at 299–300. 
 52. Id. at 308. 
11
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the case.53  But the court of appeals felt it could not avoid its 
responsibility to “identify fully the issues presented and to 
encourage reasoned discussion on a case of this magnitude.”54
The supreme court vacated the opinion of the court of 
appeals.
 
55  In its opinion, the supreme court expressly disapproved 
of the court of appeals’s decision, finding it addressed matters 
unrelated to the scope of the issues raised on appeal.56  By 
considering matters unrelated to its appellate task of reviewing the 
exercise of the district court’s discretion, the supreme court held 
that the court of appeals “inappropriately injected uncertainty as to 
the finality of its ultimate disposition. . . .”57  In addition to vacating, 
the supreme court directed that neither the majority nor the 
concurring opinions of the court of appeals be given any 
dispositional or precedential value.58
V. THE ERROR-CORRECTING LIMITATION APPLIES TO AREAS 
BEYOND THE COMMON LAW 
 
A. Constitutional Issues 
In State v. Fort,59 the court of appeals stated that in the absence 
of precedent, it is not the appropriate court to construe a provision 
of the Minnesota Constitution more expansively than the United 
States Supreme Court construed its federal counterpart.60  In Fort, 
the court of appeals was asked to change the existing law that 
required a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis of passenger 
consent-to-search cases, to a more protective rule that would 
require officers to inform passengers of their right to refuse a 
search.61  The court of appeals recognized that the goal of 
protecting citizens from unreasonable impositions upon their 
liberty and privacy was admirable.62
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Pike v. Gunyou, 491 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Minn. 1992). 
 56. Id. at n.1. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 290. 
 59. No. C2-011732, 2002 WL 1013474, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. May 21, 2002), 
reversed, 660 N.W.2d 415 (Minn. 2003). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at *2. 
 62. Id. at *4. 
  But the court also recognized 
that as “an error-correcting court, [it was] without the authority to 
12
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change the law.”63
This deference to the supreme court was similarly present in 
State v. Berge.
 
64  At issue was whether the Minnesota constitutional 
protection against self-incrimination precluded admission of 
evidence of the refusal to submit to alcohol testing made 
admissible by statute.65  In South Dakota v. Neville,66 the United States 
Supreme Court held that such a statute did not violate the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.67  The appellant in 
Berge argued that the protections against compelled self-
incrimination should be broader under the Minnesota Constitution 
than the United States Constitution.68  The court of appeals 
declined to address this argument, concluding that it was the 
“province of the ‘state supreme court’ to extend protection of the 
state constitution beyond that offered by the United States 
Supreme Court.”69
B. Statutory Interpretation 
 
As an intermediate court, the court of appeals has the 
authority to interpret statutes when there are no statutory or 
judicial precedents to follow.  Nevertheless, interpretations made 
by the court of appeals may not hold precedential power.  Even 
though the legislature, in Minnesota Statutes section 645.17(4), 
expressly references prior court interpretations as a source of 
legislative intent to be used when a court interprets present and 
subsequent laws, only interpretations by a court of last resort 
should be used.70  In Anderson-Johanningmeier v. Mid-Minnesota 
Women’s Center, Inc.,71 the supreme court stated that the principle of 
statutory construction embodied in section 645.17(4) does not 
apply to the court of appeals’ interpretation because it is not a 
court of last resort.72
In circumstances where there has been a judicial overlay on a 
   
 
 63. Id. at *3. 
 64. State v. Berge, 464 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1991). 
 65. Id. at 596. 
 66. 459 U.S. 553 (1983). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 595–96. 
 69. Id. at 597. 
 70. MINN. STAT. § 645.17(4) (2008). 
 71. 637 N.W.2d 270, 276 (Minn. 2002) (noting the court of appeals is not the 
court of last resort with respect to a statute’s construction). 
 72. Id. at 273. 
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statute, the court of appeals may be powerless to interpret the 
statute a different way.  For example, when asked to determine 
when a cause of action occurs under Minnesota’s statute of 
limitations for medical-malpractice actions,73 and to replace the 
termination-of-treatment rule with a discovery rule, the court of 
appeals declined to address the issue because of the “long standing 
judicial precedent” adopting the “termination of treatment rule.”74  
The court reached this decision despite the concurring opinions of 
two of the three member panel, suggesting that “it is time for this 
state to reject the termination of treatment rule, in favor of the 
‘discovery doctrine;’ especially in those cases involving erroneous 
diagnosis.”75
C.    Rules of Court 
 
The court of appeals must also be mindful to not overstep its 
boundaries into the domain of the rulemaking authority of the 
supreme court.  In State v. Jenkins,76 the respondent argued that he 
could not be charged for soliciting a minor if that minor had been 
previously adjudicated as an adult.77  The court of appeals declined 
to address this argument on appeal, holding that “it is not the role 
of this court to extend existing law or create new law.”78  Because 
there was no existing authority to suggest persons certified as 
juveniles for one offense should be so certified for another, the 
court of appeals did not rule on that issue.79
Additionally, the court of appeals did not address the 
respondent’s claim that he should have been entitled to appeal 
prior to trial without having to wait for the state’s notice of 
appeal.
   
80  The court of appeals recognized that the supreme court 
is the judicial body which is authorized to make substantial changes 
to the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure.81
 
      73  MINN. STAT. § 541.07(1) (2008). 
      74     Miller v. Mercy Med. Ctr., a Div. of Health Cent., Inc., 380 N.W.2d 827, 831 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
      75    Id. at 832. 
 76. No. A05-68, 2005 WL 1950241, at *12 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2005). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
  As such, it 
rejected the argument that criminal defendants should have the 
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right to file pretrial appeals.82
Sometimes, however, the court of appeals does not have the 
luxury of declining to address these types of arguments.  In 
Lennartson v. Anoka-Hennepin Independent School District No. 11,
 
83 the 
court of appeals was asked to decide whether the newly adopted 
Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct explicitly superseded a 
three-part test for lawyer disqualification set forth two years earlier 
by the supreme court.  The court of appeals acknowledged its 
function as an error-correcting court, and as such, was bound to 
follow the supreme court’s precedent in Jenson v. Touche Ross & 
Co.84  The court of appeals also noted that after the rules were 
adopted, the supreme court gave no indication of an intent to 
overrule Jensen.85  The court ultimately held that the Jenson 
balancing test was controlling despite the adoption of the 
Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct.86
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals in 
Lennartson.
 
87  It held that insofar as the test it articulated in Jenson 
was inconsistent with the revised Minnesota Rule of Professional 
Conduct, it had been superseded by the rules.88
D. Supervisory Powers 
  In Lennartson, one 
can argue the court of appeals did exactly what it was supposed to 
do, which is to not make precedent, even in light of a newly 
adopted rule.  It was the ultimate province of the supreme court to 
conclude which disqualification test was to be used going forward.  
And the supreme court was in a position to say what it meant when 
it adopted its rule. 
The supreme court possesses supervisory powers to ensure the 
fair administration of justice.89  On occasion, the supreme court 
exercises these supervisory powers over the court of appeals.  For 
example, in Sefkow v. Sefkow,90
 
 82. Id. 
 83. 638 N.W.2d 494, 496 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
 84. Id. at 497 (citing Jenson v. Touche Ross & Co., 335 N.W.2d 720, 731–32 
(Minn. 1983)) (setting forth a three part balancing test). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Lennartson v. Anoka-Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 662 N.W.2d 125 
(Minn. 2003). 
 88. Id. at 135. 
 89. State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994). 
 90. 427 N.W.2d 203 (Minn. 1998). 
 the supreme court reminded the 
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court of appeals that its function was limited to identifying errors 
and correcting them.  In Sefkow, the court of appeals did not defer 
to the district court, nor did it mention its appropriate role as a 
reviewing court.91  Instead, the court of appeals proceeded to 
review the record de novo and make its own decision.92  The 
supreme court concluded that the court of appeals had exceeded 
its limited scope of review.93
Presumably, the court of appeals would not have the authority 
to adopt a new exclusionary rule of evidence, such as that adopted 
by the supreme court involving the recording of custodial 
interrogatories.
   
94  The supreme court exercised its supervisory 
power to ensure the fair administration of justice to suppress at 
trial any statements made by a suspect in custodial interrogation 
unless the settlement was recorded.95
VI. DIFFERENCES IN THE WORK BETWEEN THE MINNESOTA SUPREME 
COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS 
To understand the error-correcting function of the court of 
appeals, it is helpful to compare and contrast the work of the 
intermediate with that of the supreme court. 
 
The most significant difference between the court of appeals 
and supreme court is the nature of the cases that come before it.  
The supreme court’s jurisdiction is discretionary, granting review 
to those cases that present such important questions, or involve 
matters of such precedential value or complexity, as to require the 
full attention of the supreme court.  The supreme court has 
repeatedly warned, however, that denial of a petition for further 
review means no more than that the supreme court has declined—
for whatever undisclosed reasons—to consider the matter.  The 
supreme court has stated that, “the denial does not give the court 
of appeals decision any more or less precedential weight than a 
court of appeals decision from which no review was sought.”96
The court of appeals, on the other hand, takes virtually all 
  
Thus, there is a level of uncertainty to the precedential effect of 
court of appeals’s opinions.   
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94.  See Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 592. 
 95.  Id. 
 96. Murphy v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 388 N.W.2d 732, 739 (Minn. 1986). 
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cases from the district court (with a few exceptions like first degree 
murder) and cases from local governments and administrative 
agencies.  These differences in jurisdiction reflect the difference in 
the error-correcting function of the court of appeals and the law 
and doctrinal function of the supreme court. 
Another major difference is that the supreme court publishes 
all of its decisions, whereas the court of appeals publishes only a 
minority of its opinions.  Although the court of appeals provides 
reasons for all of its decisions, not every case warrants a full 
opinion—cases disposed of by dismissal, denial, or other 
disposition may require only a short recitation of the court’s 
reasons.  In cases warranting a written opinion, the legislature 
suggests that the court of appeals only publish decisions that 
establish a new rule of law, overrule a previous court of appeals’s 
decision not reviewed by the supreme court, provide important 
procedural guidelines in interpreting statutes, involve a significant 
legal issue, or aid in the administration of justice. 
Although not precedential, unpublished opinions play an 
important role in the workings of the court of appeals.  
Unpublished decisions are superior to summary dispositions 
because an unpublished opinion commits thoughts to paper, 
permitting the parties to see that the judges have considered their 
arguments and know the court’s reasoning.   
VII. PRACTICE POINTERS 
Attorneys appearing before the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
must be aware of its error-correcting function.  This function makes 
appearing before the court of appeals much different from 
appearing before the Minnesota Supreme Court.  There are a few 
pointers that every attorney appearing before the Minnesota Court 
of Appeals should have in mind. 
A. Understand the Court You Are In   
Attorneys appearing before the court of appeals must have an 
understanding of the court that they are in and the function that 
the court serves.  The court of appeals is not a policy or lawmaking 
court.  If your argument must ask the court of appeals to depart 
from prior decisions, you are likely in the wrong court.  That does 
not mean that you should not make the argument because you 
must make the argument to preserve the issue for the supreme 
17
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court’s review.  It just means that your chances for success on that 
issue in the court of appeals are slim. 
B. Error-Correcting Limitations May Support Accelerated Review 
The supreme court has rarely used the tool of accelerated 
review in any context.  Unlike the Iowa Supreme Court, which 
regularly “reaches down” and takes cases for immediate review, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has shown a strong preference to review 
cases after the court of appeals has completed its work.  But one 
could argue that a case which may turn on a request to expand or 
contract existing common law should bypass the court of appeals 
because of its error-correcting limitations. 
C. Preserve the Error and Raise the Issue   
Your preparation for an appeal to an error-correcting court 
starts long before the notice of appeal is filed.  To correct an error, 
the error must have been preserved.  Moreover, appellate courts 
can only consider issues actually raised in the district court.  New 
issues presented for the first time on appeal will not be considered.  
For this reason, arguments that may be beyond the error-correcting 
function of the court of appeals should nevertheless be raised 
there, to be certain they are preserved for supreme court review. 
D. In the “Interest of Justice”   
If you fail to make a record of the error in the district court or 
to file a new trial motion, the court of appeals will apply the 
“interest of justice” standard when determining whether it should 
address the error.97  This is a high burden, particularly in the court 
of appeals because of the limits of its authority.  More often than 
not, the court of appeals will recite the standard rule that issues not 
properly preserved are not before the court.  For example, 
although the supreme court has recognized its inherent powers to 
accept a late appeal in the interest of justice, the court of appeals 
has held that it has no such inherent powers.98
 
 97. See MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 103.04. 
 98. Compare Township of Honner v. Redwood County, 518 N.W.2d 639, 641 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994) with State v. M.A.P., 281 N.W.2d 334, 336–37 (Minn. 1979). 
  The court of 
appeals considers itself constrained by the civil appellate rules, 
which prohibit extension of the time to file a notice of appeal or to 
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obtain review of an agency action.99
E. Standard of Review 
Know the standard of review for your particular issue or issues.  
If the standard is de novo, the court will look at the record with fresh 
eyes to determine if a mistake was made and will not need to give 
any deference to the district court’s decision.  If the standard is 
clear error or abuse of discretion, your chances of success in the 
court of appeals will diminish.  Under the clear-error standard, the 
district court’s error must be so clear on the record that the court 
of appeals is left with the definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made.  Similarly, under the abuse-of-discretion 
standard, the court of appeals gives deference to the trial court’s 
ruling and will not reverse it absent a clear abuse of discretion.   
 
F.  Authorities To Use 
If available, always cite to Minnesota Supreme Court cases as 
your primary authority.  As the highest court in the state, these 
decisions are binding on all courts.  If a Minnesota Supreme Court 
decision is not available on the issue, cite to the court of appeals’s 
published decisions.  If you have no other decision to cite and the 
facts are substantially similar, the unpublished decisions of the 
court of appeals may provide some guidance to the decision 
makers.  Decisions from other states or scholarly works likely have 
less weight in the court of appeals than they may have in the 
supreme court. 
G. Your Briefs and Appendices 
The shotgun approach of raising every conceivable error that 
the district court might have made to the court of appeals rarely 
works.  Focus your briefs to your best arguments of where you 
believe the district court made a mistake and that mistake had a 
significant impact on the outcome of the case.  The court of 
appeals has the record, but you should include the important 
orders and exhibits in the appendices.  This will save time for a 
high-volume court. 
 
 99. MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 126.02. 
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H. Final Judgments Versus Interlocutory Appeals 
The court of appeals generally wants to review all claimed 
errors at one time.  There are exceptions to the final-judgment rule 
that allow interlocutory appeals, but they are very narrow. 
I.  Oral Argument 
Oral argument must be carefully planned because of the 
limited time: twenty minutes for the appellant and fifteen minutes 
for the respondent.  Be prepared for questions and answer them 
directly.  Select your best issue and focus your primary attention 
there.  Know that the judges have read the briefs, so do not simply 
repeat what you have said in your brief.  Focus your argument—
even more than your brief—to address the key points and to 
counter the weaknesses in your case.   
VIII.CONCLUSION 
Now that we have enjoyed the work of the court of appeals for 
twenty-five years, it is difficult to remember a time when we did not 
have such a court.  Clearly, hundreds of litigants would not have 
had the real opportunity for a second opinion on their cases, and 
hundreds of others would have received only a summary decision.  
The court of appeals has contributed enormously to the 
effectiveness of the Minnesota Judiciary and to the high level of 
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